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Introduction 
If India’s policy toward Iran and its suspected nuclear ambitions continue to cause concern and 
anxiety in Washington, it was largely New Delhi’s own making. From the very beginning, India 
was unable to understand the American preoccupation with the ayatollahs. Indeed, Washington’s 
concerns vis-à-vis Iran and its nuclear program did not figure prominently in Indian calculations 
when it started negotiating the civilian nuclear deal with the Bush administration. 
This was visibly displayed when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached New York in 
September 2005 to attend the annual session of the UN General Assembly. The visit came 
weeks after the July 14 nuclear agreement and the Indian entourage was hoping that the 
Administration would use Singh’s presence to start the process of implementing nuclear 
cooperation. On the contrary, they were taken aback by the American preoccupation with the 
Iranian nuclear controversy and by queries about the possible Indian stand at the International 
Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA). In the words of one seasoned observer who accompanied 
the official delegation, “there are growing concerns in the Indian establishment at what many call 
an orchestrated campaign here (that is, the United States) against India’s position on Tehran’s 
nuclear proliferation.”[1] 
There is a lack of understanding in India of the historic baggage that exists between Iran and the 
United States since the fall of the Shah in 1979. While their acrimonious relations were widely 
known, New Delhi has never internalized them in its foreign policy formulations. When negotiating 
with these two countries, India behaved as if their bilateral differences would not spillover and 
affect its own desire for closer ties with Tehran and Washington. 
This was most visibly manifested the manner in which India sought to handle the problem of 
simultaneously seeking energy supplies from Iran and civilian nuclear technology from the United 
States.  
Nuclear Tango  
The rapid turn of events at the IAEA forced India to recognize the U.S. factor in shaping its policy 
on Iran, especially over its suspected nuclear program. For quiet sometime there were growing 
international concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Its clandestine and undeclared nuclear 
activities and its progress in missile programs were seen by many in the West as a sign of 
resurgent and assertive Iran and its desire to dominate the region. So long as the mediation 
efforts by European Union were in place, India could hope that the issue would be diplomatically 
resolved ‘within the IAEA’. That would have meant not only the absence of any UN-mandated 
sanctions against Iran but also India retaining its non-committal stands on Iran. 
Despite its strong refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), India has been 
committed to non-proliferation. Its prolonged and explicit exclusion from the nuclear club was its 
prime but unstated objection. The 1998 nuclear tests merely strengthened its resolve to work 
toward non-proliferation. Despite being surrounded by two nuclear powers, China and Pakistan, 
India does not subscribe to the more-the-merrier approach toward nuclear proliferation. It is within 
this larger context that one has to examine India’s behavior over the Iran controversy. 
At the same time, India’s choices were also limited. The nuclear tests of May 1998 clearly 
hampered its choices. After conducting nuclear tests in 1998 in defense of its national interest, 
New Delhi could not counsel Iran or any other country for that matter, not to take the 
weaponization path. Such advice would have been morally hollow and politically untenable. 
Therefore, from the very beginning India has opted for the technical middle path: Iran had 
voluntarily signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), renounced its nuclear option and 
therefore, so it should adhere to its treaty commitments and obligations. 
By mid-2005 however, it was obvious that the Iran file would not be closed at the IAEA but would 
be referred to the UN Security Council for further action. During the run-up to the first vote in 
September, which declared Iran to be ‘non-compliance’ of its commitments and obligations to the 
IAEA, India gave indications that it would side with Iran. 
On September 4, Foreign Minister visited Iran and met the newly-elected President Ahmadinejad. 
On the eve of his visit, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson reminded the media that both countries 
“have enjoyed deep civilizational, cultural, people-to-people links and we attach great importance 
to the bilateral relations.”[2] A few days later, speaking at a press conference in New York, Prime 
Minister Singh observed: “We have other factors with a sizeable element of the Shia population in 
our country. We have world’s second largest Shia population in our country. So we have to weigh 
all these factors.”[3] 
On the eve of the IAEA vote, the Indian Foreign Ministry issued a press release which said:  
The Prime Minister received a phone call from President Ahmadinejad of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran at the Iranian request. The President raised the issue about Iran’s nuclear programme in the 
IAEA. Prime Minister advised him that Iran should consider taking a flexible position so as to 
avoid a confrontation. The Prime Minister repeated the necessity for Iran to make concessions to 
this end. India supports the resolution of all issues through discussion and consensus in the 
IAEA.[4]  
Indian insistence on “consensus” perhaps was a signal for an impending Indian reversal. 
On September 24, 2005, much to surprise of many observers both within and outside the country 
India opted to side with the majority at the IAEA and declared Iran to be “non-compliant” of its 
obligations. Even China and Russia, countries considered friendly to Iran, could not vote with Iran 
but preferred to abstain during the vote. 
Abstention however, was not an option for India, as it would not garner any brownie points either 
with the United States or with Iran. Joining the majority appeared more sensible. When the issue 
came up again in February 2006, even China and Russia were not ready to back Iran. This made 
things a lot easier for India and to support the IAEA decision to refer Iran issue to the UN Security 
Council. 
The positive votes in favor of the United States at the IAEA however, did not go down well within 
the country. Calling it a ‘shameful vote’ an editorial in The Hindu castigated the government for its 
“willingness to abandon the independence of Indian foreign policy for the sake of strengthening its 
strategic partnership with the United States.”[5] This line became the standard refrain of the critics 
who argued that a positive vote in favor of Iran or abstention would have been in tune with 
Indian’s non-aligned foreign policy and its desire to maintain autonomous foreign policy decision 
making. 
The manner in which the Singh government handled the Iran file gave an unmistakable 
impression that New Delhi was acting under American pressure, if not duress. Weeks before the 
September vote, Congressman Tom Lantos (D-California) was quoted as saying “India must 
decide where it will stand; with the ‘ayatollahs’ of terror in Tehran or with the United States.” This 
led a mini-war of words between the United States and Indian officials.[6] 
Any lingering doubts were set aside by the official ‘clarification’ offered by India for the IAEA vote. 
The EU draft resolution, he observed:  
[R]ecognizes that “good progress has been made in Iran’s correction of the breaches and in the 
Agency’s ability to confirm certain aspects of Iran’s current declarations.” In view of this, finding 
Iran non-compliant in the context of Article XII-C of the Agency’s Statute is not justified. It would 
also not be accurate to characterize the current situation as a threat to international peace and 
security.[7] 
Iranian “non-compliance” was not justified but still India voted to declare Iran to be non-
compliant![8] This led a former Indian diplomat who served in Iran in the 1990s to depict the 
Indian role at the IAEA as “a surrogate’s surrogate.”[9] 
Furthermore, both before and after the vote, India was not able to present a logical and 
convincing case explaining the rationale for voting against Iran. Following the second vote at the 
IAEA on February 5, Prime Minister Singh told the Lok Sabha that Indian decisions were 
influenced by “our security concerns arising from proliferation activities in our extended 
neighborhood.”[10] He went to extensive lengths highlighting and underscoring that these votes 
do not “in any way, detract from the traditionally close and friendly relations we are privileged to 
enjoy with Iran.” According to him: 
As a signatory to the NPT, Iran has the legal right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
consistent with its international commitments and obligations. It is incumbent upon Iran to 
exercise these rights in the context of safeguards that it has voluntarily accepted upon its nuclear 
programme under the IAEA. 
While India recognizes Iranian right to pursue peaceful use of the nuclear energy, such a 
development would have to be within the limits of its agreements and commitments to the IAEA. 
But the manner in which India made a sudden u-turn gave an unmistakable impression that it was 
a ex post facto rationalization rather than a well thought out strategy. 
Although describing another nuclear power in its ‘extended neighborhood’ would not be in its 
interest, India has not acted on that assessment. It could persuade and convince Iran to seek a 
compromise settlement with the international community. Alternatively, it could join hands with 
other great powers in seeking a politico-diplomatic solution. India however, found an innovative 
solution: gerrymandering. India is opposed only to another nuclear power in its ‘neighborhood’ 
and this could be solved by removing Iran from the neighborhood. Surprisingly that was how India 
sought to deal with the Iran controversy. For a long time, the Annual Reports of the Ministry of 
External Affairs included Iran under the category of ‘neighbors.’[11] In a sudden departure from 
this, in 2006 Iran was removed from the neighborhood category and placed as part of ‘West 
Asian and North Africa.’[12] Such gimmicks do cast doubts about the seriousness of India’s 
opposition to a nuclear Iran and its reliability of its pronouncements. 
Moreover the Indian security establishment has also been silent on the non-conventional 
programs and ambitions of Iran. The recent strides made by Tehran in its missile capability, 
including the Shahab-4 , never evoked a public debate in India. The latest Annual Report of the 
Ministry of Defence for example, makes no mention of the Iranian nuclear and missile programs 
but warns,  
…West’s growing confrontations with Iran and North Korea have impacted India’s economic and 
energy security concerns adversely. These developments are also a matter of concern to us, as 
we share close cultural and civilizational affinities with some of these troubled states.[13]  
Tehran’s non-conventional programs are primarily viewed in India within the context of Iran’s 
rivalry and hostility toward Israel. It is not recognized that the 3,000 km-range Shahab-4 missiles 
which could threaten southern Europe are also capable of flying eastwards and reaching the 
Indian heartland.  
Not Factoring in The United States  
There is a fundamental miscalculation in India about the nuclear deal. Both during and after the 
July 14 agreement, there was never a cost/benefit analysis. The Indian nuclear establishment has 
been acrimoniously debating the pros and cons of the obtaining civilian nuclear technology from 
the United States and the accompanying restrictions about future progress. A corresponding 
overall assessment, however, is absent. The nuclear deal appears to be a vindication of its 
nuclear tests and the eventual and grudging American recognition of India’s nuclear status. 
According to this point of view, the United States, hopefully while the Bush Administration is still in 
office, would bring about far-reaching changes in domestic American non-proliferation laws and 
silence the nuclear ayatollahs from derailing the deal. Internationally the Bush Administration 
would convince other countries to accept the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. Washington would work with 
key players like China not to oppose the deal at the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). These far-
reaching steps would be taken by the Bush Administration, New Delhi hoped, while it was not 
prepared to accommodate American concerns over the nuclear stand off with Iran. 
Likewise, the Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 never figured in Indian calculations when it 
negotiated energy deals with Iran. The Act explicitly prohibits “investment of more than US$20 
million in one year in Iran’s energy sector.” It is not necessary that India is bound by the domestic 
legislation of other countries and like many others could happily ignore the provisions of the ILSA. 
For example, according to a CRS study, since 1999 over $11.2 billion has been invested in the 
Iranian oil industry by various European and Japanese companies.[14] 
The problem however, is not American sanctions vis-à-vis Iran, but Indian unfamiliarity with the 
possible punitive fallouts of energy-related investments in Iran. In recent years, India has been 
negotiating three major deals with Iran: namely, a 25-year contract for the supply of 5 million tons 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG); possible supply of natural gas through a pipeline that would pass 
through Pakistan; and exploration of oil and gas in Iran undertaken by Indian oil companies. The 
pipeline project and gas exploration would definitely fall into the categories of ‘investments’ as 
defined by the ILSA and are in excess of the ILSA ceiling of $20 million. The Iran-Pakistan-India 
pipeline for example, is estimated at $7 billion. As far as one can fathom, India never factored in 
the ILSA dimension when it began negotiating these energy deals with Iran. 
 
‘Strategic’ Ties with Iran  
The official and popular portrayal of the Indo-Iranian ties as ‘strategic’ causes consternation 
among many U.S. law-makers. As highlighted by the letter send by a group of U.S. House of 
Representatives to Prime Minister Singh in May 2007: 
India’s pursuit of closer relations with Iran appears to be inconsistent with the letter and spirit of 
the July 18th, 2005 announcement by you and President Bush of the establishment of a “global 
partnership” between our two countries. It also is contrary to the pledge that India “would play a 
leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
including nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.”[15] 
Such American concerns are partly a misunderstanding of the ‘strategic’ component of India’s 
relations with Iran. It is true that both counties have an ongoing ‘strategic dialogue’ on 
hydrocarbons and bilateral energy deals that are also viewed and presented as ‘strategic.’ If they 
bear fruit, energy cooperation with Iran could significantly contribute to India’s energy security. 
But at the same time, hydrocarbon supplies from Iran would just be one part of the basket of 
energy options available to India and would not be the panacea for its overall energy security 
problem. 
Moreover, while Iran is an important source of oil and natural gas, it has always been a marginal 
player in India’s overall energy basket. Despite the media hype, much of India’s hydrocarbon 
needs are met by countries such as Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar. Until the Kuwait crisis 
(1990-91), Iraq was India’s major supplier of oil and the increase in the Iranian share was partly 
due to prolonged UN-sanctions and Iraq’s inability to export oil. It was only the mid-1990s that 
Iran began supplying significant quantities of crude oil to India. For example during 2004-05 India 
imported $2.9 billion worth of crude from Iran and this constitutes just eight percent of its total 
hydrocarbon imports. In 2005-06 for example, its energy import bill stood at over $50 billion and 
only $4.12 billion came from Iran. In short, energy calculations alone do not explain the pro-Iran 
sentiments that prevail in India. 
There is another dimension to the ‘strategic’ partnership. In recent years it has become 
fashionable for India to pursue a ‘strategic’ dialogue with a number of countries. The recent 
Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs, for example, says: “ India has also entered into 
strategic partnership with the European Union, UK, France and Germany.”[16] It also describes 
India’s ties with countries such as China, Japan, Indonesia, Russia, Morocco, South Africa, 
Nigeria and Brazil, as ‘strategic.’ The Ministry-run Indian Council of World Affairs for example, 
conducted as many as 16 ‘bilateral strategic dialogues’ during 2006-07.[17] At times, even many 
non-official track-II negotiations are termed ‘strategic.’[18] Hence, one should not attribute 
excessive importance to the ‘strategic’ component of India’s relations with Iran. 
There were suggestions that closer ties with Iran were indeed part of “ India’s great-power 
aspirations and New Delhi’s concomitant expansive agenda for Central Asia and beyond.”[19] 
While Iran might contribute to its energy security, closer ties with an Ahmadinejad-led Iran would 
be a costlier mistake. The refusal of Prime Minister Singh to attend the summit meeting of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization in June 2006 should rest any such speculations. With the 
Iranian President racking up so many controversies over his statements on holocaust and nuclear 
ambitions, Singh perhaps was not ready for a photo opportunity with the Iranian leader.  
Mishandled Realism  
Had it handled the Iran issue tactfully, the Singh government could have easily convinced both its 
domestic critics and American interlocutors. Iran, especially under the leadership of Ahmadinejad, 
is heading for a confrontation with the outside world. As happened during the early 1980s at the 
height of its Islamic revolution, Tehran is less inclined toward accommodation and negotiation. 
Regarding the nuclear stand-off, its belligerent tone and refusal to comply with the demands of 
the IAEA did not go well with the international community. 
On two occasions the Security Council has exhibited Tehran’s isolation. Resolutions 1737 
(December 2006) and Resolution 1747 (February 2007) were modest and did not impose severe 
sanctions against Iran. They however, unequivocally conveyed a blunt message: the Iranian 
isolation in the Security Council. The international community, including China and Russia, two 
important friends, did not share the Iranian version of the events. On both occasions Qatar, the 
only Arab member in the Council, sided with the majority. If this was not enough, in May 2007 the 
IAEA again reported that Iran had not complied with the demands of the Security Council 
demands. This would mean that Tehran is heading for an additional round of sanctions. 
Moreover there are subterranean tensions in the Persian Gulf region as Arab neighbors are 
uneasy about an aggressive Iran. The willingness of oil-rich Arab countries to seek nuclear 
energy is a definite sign of this disquiet. Being small and weak powers, they are not in a position 
to openly articulate their concerns vis-à-vis an emboldened Iran. Should there be a military 
confrontation over Iran, these Arab states would be the first to suffer the consequences. 
For its part, India has and seeks closer friendships with Arab countries in the region such as 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and in the not-so-distant future, even Iraq. Currently over 3.5 million Indian 
expatriates are gainfully employed in the Gulf countries and they not only contribute significant 
foreign exchange remittances back home but also have emerged as source of strength and 
cooperation between India and these countries. Many of these countries view the Iranian nuclear 
program with suspicion, and India can not ignore the anxieties of the Arab neighbors of Iran. 
Under such circumstances, Prime Minister Singh could have easily convinced his citizens that 
India’s long-term interests would not be served by identifying and supporting a country that is 
increasingly facing international sanction and isolations. The events of early 1990s clearly 
indicated that Indo-Iranian relations could flourish only when Iran is accommodative of its 
neighbors concerns and pursues a friendlier posture vis-à-vis the wider international community. 
Conversely, their bilateral ties would flounder when Iran is heading toward international isolation.  
Prognosis  
Irrespective of its public posturing and pronouncements, India has a dual policy vis-à-vis Iran. As 
a country with large quantities of oil and gas reserves, Iran will continue to be important for India’s 
search for energy security. Its newly found economic confidence has enabled India to pursue 
long-term projects such as LNG and pipeline options. Indian oil companies have the financial 
powers and official backing to explore upstream activities in different parts of the world. 
At the same time, it is not easy for India to do business with Iran. As highlighted by the ongoing 
row over pricing, India will find it increasingly difficult to reach a workable business partnership 
with Tehran. Even without the American factor, New Delhi would have to work out an effective 
negotiating strategy vis-à-vis Iran. 
Nuclear Iran however, does not serve Indian interests. And even the Left in India which was 
highly critical of the IAEA votes, was demanding Indian ‘abstention’ and not support for Iran. Their 
prime refrain was: why not abstain like the Chinese? This logic disappeared following the 
February 2006 vote at the IAEA and the two Security Council resolutions, when China voted 
against Iran. It is therefore more a question of anti-Americanism rather than support for Iran that 
shapes the attitude of the Indian Left. 
The IAEA votes exhibit the influence of hardened realism on India’s Iran policy. But the public 
posturing of India’s policy is shaped by domestic political calculations. As Theodore Wright 
observed in the early 1980s, when it comes to the Middle East, Indian Muslims could be 
compared to the Jews of America.[20] Both have a strong involvement in the unfolding 
developments of this region and exert considerable influence in shaping the policy of their 
countries toward the Middle East. Unlike the American case, however, the role and influence of 
Indian Muslims upon its Middle East policy has never been discussed by the mainstream 
intelligentsia. As Prime Minister Singh unexpectedly admitted in September 2005, there is a 
Muslim factor in India’s foreign policy, and particularly a Shia factor in India’s Iran policy. While 
such considerations do compel India to tailor its case to suit the domestic audience and political 
constituencies, its international behavior has been shaped by realism, with the result there is 
always an Indian duality. Its pro-Iranian public pronouncements would be at odds with its hard-
nosed stand at the IAEA, UN, or other forums. 
A meaningful resolution of the Iran issue would demand a fundamental reconciliation between 
Washington and Tehran. Since India seeks closer ties with both these countries a modicum of 
civilized interaction between them would be in India’s interest. There are hopes that New Delhi 
could capitalize on the mutual distrust and aspire to be the proverbial midwife. In the words of 
Christine Fair, “Although it will not likely occur during the tenures of [George W.] Bush and 
Ahmadinejad, a future U.S.-Iranian rapprochement could be facilitated by India, akin to Pakistan’s 
role in the U.S.-Chinese détente.”[21] Though flattering, New Delhi does not enjoy sufficient trust 
in both the capitals. If its IAEA votes antagonized Tehran, the manner in which they were 
obtained annoyed Washington. The prolongation of the price negotiations are a clear indication 
that things are not well on the Indo-Iranian front. 
On the nuclear issue it is obvious that Iran is gradually alienating itself from its traditional friends 
like China. Therefore, it should not be difficult for Prime Minister Singh to be more assertive in 
explaining his rationale for opposing Iran on the nuclear issue. Not only to silence the U.S. critics 
of the nuclear deal, but to convince his domestic skeptics as well. 
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